When assessing the feasibility of remediation following the detonation of a radiological dispersion device or improvised nuclear device in a large city, several issues should be considered including the levels and characteristics of the radioactive contamination, the availability of resources required for decontamination, and the planned future use of the city's structures and buildings. Currently, little is known about radionuclide penetration into construction materials in an urban environment. Knowledge in this area would be useful when considering costs of a thorough decontamination of buildings, artificial structures, and roads in an affected urban environment. Pripyat, a city substantially contaminated by the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident in April 1986, may provide some answers. The main objective of this study was to assess the depth of Cs penetration into reinforced concrete structures in a highly contaminated urban environment under natural weather conditions. Thirteen reinforced concrete core samples were obtained from external surfaces of a contaminated building in Pripyat. The concrete cores were drilled to obtain sample layers of 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-20, 20-30, 30-40, and 40-50 Cs.
INTRODUCTION
Various U.S. federal and international agencies have attempted to prepare for an event involving the detonation of a radiological dispersion device or improvised nuclear device. Some organizations have detailed the possible reasons, means, and consequences of such an event while others have attempted to develop the necessary models (Brown et al. 2006; IAEA 2002a; IAEA 2002b; IAEA 2009; PBS 2003; Thiessen et al. 1997 Thiessen et al. , 2005a Thiessen et al. , 2005b Thiessen et al. , 2008 Thiessen et al. , 2009 . Among the significant issues to be addressed are the intensity and characteristics of the radioactive contamination, the availability of resources required for decontamination, and the planned future use of the city's buildings and infrastructure. However, several problems remain unsolved, including the consequent radionuclide penetration into construction materials in an urban environment. Knowledge in this area would help assess the costs of a thorough decontamination of buildings, artificial structures, and roads in an affected urban environment following a nuclear or radiological event.
At present, only one place exists where radioactive contamination in an urban environment can be studied: Pripyat, Ukraine. The borders of the highly contaminated city of Pripyat are located about 2.5-5 km away from the destroyed unit of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) (Fig. 1) . Once a modern industrial city with a population of 55,000, Pripyat is now completely abandoned because it is part of the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (ChEZ), § an area in the Ukraine heavily contaminated by radionuclides (e.g., 90 Sr, 137 Cs, and transuranics) from the ChNPP accident in April 1986. The Soviet Union government established the ChEZ soon after the accident. The ChEZ has its own administrative system, and its land is currently defined as radiation hazardous land, i.e., not to be used for human habitation or § Official Web site of the ChEZ Administration: http://www.ic-chernobyl.kiev.ua/ Pu (Baryakhtar et al. 2003 ). An aerial gamma survey of Pripyat is illustrated in Fig. 2 . Despite the decontamination efforts from 1986 to 1989, most buildings, structures, and roads are still highly contaminated in Pripyat, making it an ideal place to study radionuclide distribution, redistribution, and migration in an urban environment. So far there has been only one study involving radionuclide penetration into construction materials (Bondarkov et al. 2005) , which was focussed on bricks. Concrete, the most common construction material, has remained unstudied.
METHODS AND RESULTS
The most contaminated area in Pripyat was selected, based on radiation survey data obtained by the Chernobyl Center's International Radioecology Laboratory (IRL) The southern building wall is defined as a relatively dry wall since it is regularly lit by the sun. The northern wall is considered as a relatively wet wall. Immediately after the sampling, each reinforced concrete core sample was packed in such a way to prevent an uncontrolled redistribution of radioactive particles within one sample or among samples. Each sample was properly labeled. Two core samples were obtained from each floor chosen of the southern and northern facing walls, and one core sample was obtained from the building roof. The following three-symbol notation was used to indicate the locations in the building where the samples were obtained ( detector was used to obtain the beta particle flux measurements. The detector BDKB-01R uses anthracene, a fine crystalline organic scintillator, applied as a thin film on a truncated cone-shaped plexiglas light guide. From the outside, the scintillator is covered with several layers of light resistant aluminum film. The diameter of the measurement window is 6.5 cm. The detector design makes it possible to measure beta radiation if there is an associated background gamma radiation. For this purpose, the unit has a detachable aluminum alloy lid-filter installed on the side of the unit and does not change the measurements † † MKS-01R-01 (or MKC-01P-01 in Russian) is a universal dosimeter for measuring alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation. The detector was placed 1 cm above the surface. Two 100-second measurements in each location were taken, with and without a beta filter; only gamma irradiation is measured when the beta filter is used, and both beta and gamma irradiation are measured when the filter is not used.
The beta particle flux was estimated as a difference between the two measurements. This was completed at five points in a 30 cm x 30 cm area surrounding each location where the reinforced concrete core samples were obtained.
The thirteen reinforced concrete cores were removed from the field and drilled under laboratory conditions. A 14-mm diameter drill was used to sample the following layers starting A specially designed beta-spectrometer was used with a 60-mm diameter, thin-film Cs. After background subtraction, spectra obtained for the calibration phantoms were described by cubic splines, which were subsequently used to describe sample spectra. Cs were present in the concrete prior to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident due to global fallout. This is unlikely, however, since surface soil layers (which may have contained the fallout) were not used in making the concrete. Cs were present in the concrete prior to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident due to global fallout. This is unlikely, however, since surface soil layers (which may have contained the fallout) were not used in making the concrete. therefore, the value of minimum detectable activity is provided.
